From Concept to Console: A DIY Firewall Configuration System for FortiGate Devices.
MSPs routinely stage firewalls under tight maintenance windows with L1 technicians who rotate between clients. Early bring-up often mixes personal laptops, shared credentials, and ad‑hoc scripts—creating avoidable risk and inconsistent outcomes. FortressFlash proposes a single‑purpose, handheld console appliance that delivers a repeatable, auditable baseline without placing a laptop on the critical path.
How it works: Operators select a profile from microSD and connect a standard RJ‑45→DE‑9→MAX3232 chain to the console port. The device pushes a vetted CLI bundle, gates risky steps with confirmations, and records a scroll‑back log for audit. The current prototype targets FortiGate 60E and has demonstrated console capture on a Palo Alto PA‑200.
Security posture (today → roadmap): The prototype constrains scope to console‑only accounts and treats profiles as immutable inputs. The next platform—Raspberry Pi Pico 2 W—unlocks signed & attested boot, 8 KB OTP‑sealed key material, encrypted boot, and a SHA‑256 accelerator for bundle signing and log integrity.
Value: Fewer mistakes, faster staging, and a clearer audit trail for first‑touch configuration. For MSPs, the device standardizes field work while reducing the attack surface of roaming laptops.
Managed-service providers often ask Level-1 technicians to stage FortiGate firewalls under tight change windows. In practice, first-boot turn-up is slowed by repeated laptop tethering, reconfiguring the admin PC onto the factory management subnet, and other setup friction before a vetted baseline can be applied. FortressFlash addresses this usability gap with a self-contained, Raspberry Pi Pico–based appliance that lets L1 staff deliver a pre-vetted, version-controlled baseline configuration over UART—without a laptop—while embedding hardware-rooted security. The current prototype couples a Waveshare RP2040-Plus, capacitive-touch display, and microSD storage with modular MicroPython firmware. Security primitives—planned for migration to Raspberry Pi Pico 2 W—include signed/attested boot, OTP-sealed keys, and SHA-256 integrity checks.
A pragmatic three-phase methodology guided development: rapid hardware familiarization, iterative firmware prototyping, and STRIDE-aligned threat modeling. Bench trials on FortiGate 60E units validate stable console-session establishment (20/20 successful logins without resets), authenticated CLI interaction, SD-backed profile selection, and live scroll logging. At submission time, integration of the end-to-end automated first-boot push is not yet complete; the evaluation therefore reports component-level behavior and documents the dispatcher design intended to enable fast, repeatable deployment once integrated.
Threat analysis motivates PIN-gated access, file-level encryption of removable media, console-only service accounts, and optional device–firewall binding to mitigate spoofing, tampering, and credentialexposure risks. A near-term roadmap details configuration signing, attested boot/firmware, and rolebased access. Beyond its academic contribution, FortressFlash’s portable, zero-laptop workflow and planned cryptographic safeguards are designed with regulatory frameworks such as NIST 800- 171/CMMC in mind. The underlying architecture remains vendor-agnostic, and its UART-driven approach can be extended to other CLI-centric platforms that share similar staging challenges.
In sum, this thesis documents the design, partial implementation, and security analysis of a field-oriented tool intended to turn error-prone, laptop-dependent staging into a repeatable, auditable process—while charting a clear path to multi-vendor expansion.
Keywords: Fortinet, FortiGate, firewall configuration, CLI automation, Raspberry Pi Pico, UART, MicroPython, STRIDE threat modeling, secure boot, CMMC, embedded systems security, managed service providers (MSP)